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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to review the proceedings below is 
founded upon Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises from personal injuries plaintiff 
claims to have suffered on February 29, 1980 when she stepped 
into an open man hole at the Holiday business premises. 
Plaintiff sued Holiday. Holiday filed a third-party complaint 
seeking indemnity from Airport Shuttle Parking. The theory of 
Holiday's Third-Party Complaint was that its landlord, Airport, 
had contracted to procure liability insurance for Holiday as 
part of the leasing arrangement. Airport denied any such 
obligation. 
Just prior to the date of trial in the case, Holiday 
entered into a settlement agreement with plaintiff. Under the 
terms of the settlement, Holiday paid $15,000.00 to plaintiff 
and received a complete release of liability. Holiday further 
agreed to stipulate to a judgment of approximately a quarter 
million dollars. However, the settlement agreement provided 
that such judgment would not be collectible against Holiday, 
but would only be collectible against Airport or Airport's 
insurers. 
Upon learning of the pending settlement arrangement, 
Airport's attorney moved to bifurcate the issues raised by the 
Third-Party Complaint from those raised by the original 
Complaint for trial. This motion was granted. Shortly 
thereafter, plaintiff and Holiday finalized the settlement. 
The trial proceeded before Judge David Dee on the Third-Party 
Complaint to determine Airport's obligation, if any, to procure 
insurance for Holiday. Holiday prevailed in that trial and 
judgment was entered declaring that under the lease contract, 
Airport had been obligated to obtain liability insurance 
coverage for Holiday. 
Following this judgment, the issue remained as to 
what amount Airport owed to Holiday. Judge Scott Daniels ruled 
on summary judgment that Airport's obligation to Holiday was 
limited to the $15,000.00 that Holiday had actually paid to 
satisfy plaintiff's claim. At this hearing, for the first 
time, Holiday (whose interests were now assigned to plaintiff) 
raised an argument to the effect that Airport in fact had 
obtained insurance coverage for Holiday. This argument was 
inconsistent with the Third-Party Complaint that Holiday had 
filed. 
Plaintiff appealed Judge Daniels' ruling to this 
court. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the quarter million 
dollar judgment should be enforced against Airport and also 
should be made a judgment against Home Insurance (a non party 
at this point). This court remanded the matter for a 
determination of whether or not Holiday was an insured of Home 
Insurance. 
During the pendency of the appeal, plaintiff filed a 
new lawsuit against Home Insurance and Airport seeking a 
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determination that Home Insurance was liable for the quarter 
million dollar stipulated judgment. Judge Dennis Frederick 
dismissed the claims in that lawsuit as against Airport in view 
of the fact that those claims were identical to the claims in 
the already pending lawsuit. Following discovery in the second 
lawsuit, it was consolidated with the earlier lawsuit and 
assigned to Judge Daniels. 
Following cross motions for summary judgment, Judge 
Daniels entered his summary order determining that: 
1. The Home Insurance policy did not provide 
direct insurance coverage to Holiday. 
2. That Airport had breached its obligation to 
procure insurance for Holiday. 
3. That the measure of Holiday's damages for the 
breach was $15,000.00. 
Judgment was awarded against Airport in the amount of 
$15,000.00. Plaintiff has appealed this judgment. 
FACTS 
(As indicated in plaintiff's brief, there are two 
files in these consolidated cases. Defendant will use the same 
method of citation as plaintiff, i.e. R will refer to the 
record in Case No. C81-4453; R2 will refer to the record in 
Case No. C86-7570; transcripts and depositions will be 
identified by the proceeding involved.) 
PREMISES 
1. Airport Shuttle Parking (Airport) was a 
partnership consisting of two individuals, Harold Hinckley 
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and Rex Howell. The partnership leased a parking lot and 
building adjacent to the Salt Lake International Airport. 
Their customers parked cars at the parking lot and were 
shuttled to the airport terminals by Airport's van drivers. 
(Transcript of Trial, October 5, 1982 numbered as part of R. p. 
536.) 
2. The building used by Airport was larger than 
it needed. It sublet a portion of that building to Holiday 
Rent-A-Car (Holiday). 
ACCIDENT 
3. On February 29, 1980, plaintiff 
Christiansen was employed by Airport. She happened to be 
walking in the portion of the building sublet to Holiday when 
she stepped in an open manhole. The manhole cover had been 
removed by Holiday employees who were fixing a drain. 
(Complaint, R-l-3.) 
4. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit 
against Holiday claiming to have suffered injuries when she 
stepped into the manhole. (Complaint, R-l-3.) The Complaint 
involved liability questions of contributory negligence from 
plaintiff's failure to observe the manhole. The extent of 
plaintiff's injuries was also questionable. Plaintiff claimed 
to be almost totally disabled. However, two years after the 
accident her total medical expenses were just $5,029.58 which 
included approximately $1,200.00 for psychiatric care. 
(Stevens Affidavit, R-476-484.) One of plaintiff's treating 
doctors characterized her complaints as inconsistent with her 
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physical condition and emotional in origin. (Depo. of Dr. 
Howe, pp. 25-26, 31, 33.) After litigation had been initiated, 
plaintiff underwent an independent medical examination by Dr. 
Gene Smith who reported: 
No objective evidence of any disabling 
condition caused by the accident described 
of 2/29/80. 
Discussion: There is a low threshold to 
any kind of discomfort, either real or 
imagined in this individual as evidenced by 
her requiring a pain clinic approach to 
treating her symptoms, plus the over 
response to maneuvers in the examination 
that bordered on hysteria. 
(Dr. Smith Report attached to Stevens Affidavit, R 476-484.) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
5. Plaintiff's Complaint against Holiday was 
filed on June 1, 1981. On February 22, 1982, Holiday filed a 
Third-Party Complaint against Airport claiming that Airport had 
an obligation under their sublease to provide insurance for 
Holiday. 
6. Prior to the trial date, there was a pretrial 
settlement conference. At that time, plaintiff's attorneys 
requested $85,000.00 in settlement of her case. Holiday and 
Airport jointly offered $15,000.00 in settlement. (Stevens 
Affidavit, R-476-484.) 
7. Shortly before trial, Holiday and plaintiff 
entered into a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the 
settlement agreement, Holiday Baid plaintiff $15,000.00. 
Holiday agreed that judgment could be taken against it in an 
amount determined by the court in excess of $15,000.00. 
However, such judgment would be unenforceable against Holiday 
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or any of its principals and only enforceable against Airport 
and/or its insurer if the Third-Party Complaint was 
successful, 
8. Holiday and plaintiff presented the 
settlement agreement to Judge Phillip Fishier and requested 
the entry of judgment. Judge Fishier specifically declined 
to participate in determining any damage amounts to be 
awarded. (R-197-198A.) Holiday and plaintiff thereafter 
stipulated to an unenforceable judgment total of $246,033.08. 
This judgment was entered on October 1, 1982. More than eight 
years have passed since the judgment was entered and it has now 
expired. 
9. After Judge Fishier entered the judgment, 
trial went forward on the third-party claim between Holiday and 
Airport. The principals of Airport both testified that they 
did not believe their leasing agreement required them to obtain 
any insurance coverage for Holiday. (Trial transcript, pp. 
31-32, 45-46.) Nevertheless, the jury ruled against Airport. 
Judgment was entered determining that under the lease 
agreement, Airport was obligated to provide insurance coverage 
for Holiday. 
10. Plaintiff, as Holiday's assignee, took no 
action in the case for five months. Airport filed a motion for 
summary judgment requesting that the court determine that its 
total obligation for failure to obtain liability insurance was 
$15,000.00. In its response, Holiday (now represented by 
Samuel King pursuant to the assignment of Holiday's rights to 
6 
plaintiff) argued for the first time that Airport had, in fact, 
obtained insurance• 
Following hearing, Judge Daniels concluded that: 
Airport did not insure Holiday; it agreed 
to provide insurance. It had no 
contractual obligation to defend Holiday. 
The huge judgment against Holiday did not 
flow from Airport's failure to insure 
Holiday. The only damages that flowed from 
that breach were the $15,000.00 payment 
made by Holiday and its attorney's fees and 
costs. Plaintiff could receive from 
Holiday's assignment no more than Holiday 
had to assign: a loss of $18,500.00. 
I hold, therefore, that plaintiff is 
entitled to no more than $18,500.00 from 
Airport ($3,500.00 of which has already 
been paid). 
R-488. 
11. Plaintiff appealed from Judge Daniels' 
ruling. Plaintiff argued in her appellate brief that that the 
quarter million dollar judgment should be enforced against both 
Airport and Home Insurance. Airport argued that any recovery 
was limited to $15,000.00, which was the amount Holiday had 
paid. Airport further argued that the quarter million dollar 
judgment was a sham and a fraud in view of the very 
questionable nature of plaintiff's case on both liability.and 
damages and the fact that plaintiff had offered to settle the 
case for approximately one third of that amount less than two 
months before the unenforceable judgment had been entered. 
This court remanded the case for determination as to whether 
Home did, in fact, insure Holiday. 
13. On remand, cross-motions for summary judgment 
were again presented to Judge Daniels who ruled that Home 
Insurance did not insure Holiday. Judge Daniels went on to 
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rule that the unenforceable judgment stipulated to by Holiday 
did not affect Airport!s obligation to Holiday. Airport*s 
obligation was $15,000.00. He entered judgment in that amount 
against Airport and in favor of plaintiff as the assignee of 
Holiday. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Airport takes no position with regard to the issue of 
whether or not Home insures Holiday. Airport"s principals did 
not attempt to secure such insurance. However, if plaintiff is 
able to establish that such insurance does exist, then Airport 
did not breach any agreement with Holiday and should be 
dismissed. 
If this court determines that Home did not insure 
Holiday, in view of the judgment entered by Judge Dee, 
Airport must concede that it breached an obligation to procure 
the insurance. However, Airport's liability for that breach is 
limited to $15,000.00, the amount by which Holiday was damaged 
as a result of the breach. 
Plaintiff is Holiday's assignee. Plaintiff has no 
direct action of any kind against Airport. It is clear that if 
Holiday had not made an assignment to plaintiff, Holiday would 
only be entitled to recover its losses, i.e. $15,000.00. The 
mere fact that an assignment was made cannot increase Airport's 
obligation beyond that amount. 
Throughout these proceedings, plaintiff has relied on 
a series of cases involving "conditional settlements" such as 
the one in this case. There is a split of authority as to 
whether the unenforceable stipulated amount of a judgment can 
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be collected against a recalcitrant insurer. Those courts 
permitting the enforcement of such "conditional judgments" do 
so on the theory that an insured needs this right as a weapon 
to compel his insurance company to fulfill its duty to defend 
and other obligations as an insurer. However, there is no 
authority supporting the enforcement of such a "conditional 
judgment11 against private individuals such as those involved in 
this case. Those few cases that have considered such an 
attempt have rejected it, relying on simple principals of 
assignment as above noted. 
Additionally, the stipulated judgment of nearly a 
quarter million dollars is a patent sham. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IF HOME INSURES HOLIDAY, AIRPORT HAS NOT BREACHED ITS 
CONTRACT AND CONSEQUENTLY MUST BE DISMISSED. 
As noted in the factual statement, the basis of the 
Complaint against Airport is that it breached a contract to 
obtain insurance for Holiday. If, in fact, such insurance 
was obtained, there is no breach and the case must be 
dismissed. 
It has consistently been the position of Airport that 
it believed that it was not obligated to obtain insurance for 
Holiday and, therefore, it made no effort to do so. Any claim 
in plaintifffs brief that Airport's principals or its attorneys 
have at any time expressed a different position is simply 
inaccurate. Airport's attorneys have stated that Airport 
itself has liability insurance but have never made any 
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statements to the effect that Holiday was directly insured by 
Home, 
Airport urges no position to the court as to whether 
Home did or did not directly insure Holiday. Clearly, if this 
court determines that Holiday was insured by Home, that 
determination runs to Airport's benefit and Airport is entitled 
to a judgment of dismissal. However, Airport must take issue 
with plaintiff's brief to the extent it suggests that Airport, 
its principals or its attorneys have been anything other than 
consistent in their testimony and position regarding this issue 
from the initiation of this case forward. 
POINT II 
IF AIRPORT BREACHED ITS OBLIGATION TO OBTAIN INSURANCE 
FOR HOLIDAY, DAMAGES ARE LIMITED TO THE $15,000.00 
WHICH HOLIDAY HAD TO SPEND TO SETTLE THE CASE. 
Since Holiday was able to settle Christiansen's 
case upon payment of $15,000.00, without the obligation to pay 
anything further, the lack of insurance available to Holiday 
has only caused damage to it of $15,000.00. (Holiday's 
attorney's fees incurred in defending the principal action have 
previously been paid.) 
The fact that after settling out of the case, Holiday 
voluntarily entered into a judgment stipulation which was 
unenforceable against it can have no relevance or bearing on 
Airport's obligations. 
There is a split of judicial authority as to whether 
"conditional judgments" which provide for unenforceable 
judgment amounts can ever be enforced. Utah has no case law in 
point. Airport submits that such settlements are inherently 
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collusive. The parties who agree to the judgments, have no 
concern over what amount is awarded because they won't be 
paying it. 
The authorities are clear that such judgments will 
only be enforced against insurance companies who have ongoing 
duties of defense and other fiduciary duties to their 
insureds. Such judgments are never enforced against private 
individuals such as Mr. Hinckley and Mr. Howell. 
A. The Breach of a Contract to Procure Insurance 
Entitles the Aggrieved Party to Compensation for 
Damages Actually Caused, It Does Not Establish 
the Breaching Party as an Insurer. 
The jury in the trial before Judge Dee determined 
that Airport had an obligation to procure liability insurance 
for Holiday. A contract to procure insurance is no different 
from any other contract that may be entered into by two 
parties. Any damages resulting from a breach of that contract 
are to be measured by the traditional measure of contract 
damages. 
The damages in general, for the breach of a 
contract, are properly measured by the 
amount necessary to place the non-breaching 
party in as good a position as if the 
contract had been performed. 
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, the contract was between Airport and 
Holiday. Holiday's measure of damages is to be in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed. As applied to 
the facts of this case, the restoration of the $15,000.00 that 
Holiday expended in settlement will put Holiday in a position 
of having suffered no loss. 
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The party who undertakes an obligation to procure 
insurance does not, himself, become an insurer. Redmond v. 
Petty Motor Co., 242 P.2d 302 (Utah 1952). He simply is a 
party who has breached a contract. None of the special duties 
imposed on an insurer apply to him. His liability upon 
breaching that contract is to pay the actual damages incurred 
and nothing more. See, also, the case of Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company v. H.C. Price Company, 694 P.2d 782 
(Ala. 1985). 
Even when the promise to obtain insurance 
is breached, the promissor does not thereby 
become an insurer, but is liable only for 
damages. 
694 P.2d at pp. 785, 786. 
The importance of the distinction that Airport is a 
partnership of two private individuals and not an insurer 
cannot be over-emphasized. Under the facts of many reported 
decisions dealing with a breach of contract to procure 
insurance, this distinction is of little consequence and may be 
glossed over. But in this case it is critical. 
Plaintiff's brief attempts to argue that the recent 
case of Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corporation, 771 
P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989) makes one who agrees to procure 
insurance into an insurer. The case simply does not stand for 
this proposition. The opinion clearly states: 
If a party contractually agrees to purchase 
insurance for another, the agreement is to 
be construed under general contract 
principles and, if insurance is not 
obtained, the party is liable for breach of 
contract. 
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771 P.2d at 670. 
There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that by 
breaching a contract to procure insurance, a party becomes an 
insurer or takes on any of the special duties of an insurer. 
Frequently, as in the Pickover situation, a damage 
assessment would be the same regardless of whether an insurer 
is involved or just an individual. However, in some cases, as 
the instant one, the distinction is absolutely crucial. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized this in the case of 
Bentley v. Fayas, 50 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1951) as follows: 
The liability of one who breaches a 
contract to procure insurance is to pay 
damages, and is not that of an insurer. In 
many fact situations, the end result of the 
amount with which the party guilty of the 
breach may be required to pay to the party 
sustaining the loss would be the same, 
whichever of the two theories of liability 
be adopted. However, in situations like 
the instant case, radically different 
results would be obtained, depending on 
which of the two theories be adopted. It 
is, therefore, essential that the correct 
theory of liability be applied here. 
See, also, the case of Klonis v. Armstrong, 
436 S.2d 213 (Fla. 1983). In the Klonis case, plaintiffs 
carried a homeowners policy through their insurance agent, 
Armstrong. Plaintiffs also contacted Armstrong regarding 
getting a special policy through Lloyds of London for insurance 
of some listed personal property. The Lloyds policy would have 
been primary insurance on that property, while the homeowners 
policy would have provided excess insurance. Armstrong failed 
to follow through and obtain the insurance from Lloyds. The 
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listed personal property was stolen. The homeowners carrier 
paid for part of the loss and attempted to subrogate against 
the agent for his negligence in failing to get the Lloyds 
policy. The carrier argued that if the Lloyds policy had been 
obtained as requested, Lloyds would have had to pay the entire 
loss and the carrier would not have had to pay any amount 
towards the loss. The Florida court rejected this contention 
stating as follows: 
Consolidated also argues that Armstrong 
became, in effect, a primary insurance 
carrier by virtue of its unfilled promise 
to secure the primary insurance coverage 
and, therefore, became liable to 
Consolidated upon equitable subrogation 
principals . . . but this argument is 
likewise based on an erroneous premis'e, 
i.e. that Armstrong's legal obligation to 
Klonis was equivalent to the insurance 
contract made by a primary insurance 
carrier. Armstrong's liability was not 
co-extensive with the Lloyds policy 
originally issued and then later 
cancelled. On the contrary, Armstrong's 
liability was for damages resulting from 
his negligence or breach of contract in 
failing to obtain insurance coverage. 
436 S.2d at 217. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court went on to uphold the dismissal of all 
claims. 
B. The Assignment of Holiday's Right of Action 
Against Airport Cannot Increase Any Claim That 
Holiday May Have Had Against Airport. 
In the instant case, Christiansen has received the 
assignment of Holiday's right of action against Airport. The 
mere fact of this assignment cannot in any way vary the size or 
character of Airport's obligation to Holiday. To the contrary, 
an assignment of a cause of action does not change the 
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breaching party's obligation whatsoever. Aird Insurance 
Agency v. Zion's First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 
1980). As the court in the Aird Insurance case commented: 
It is apparent that Transamerica had only 
a security interest in the account which 
had long since been satisfied, and since 
the assignee gains nothing more, and 
acquires no greater interest than had his 
assignor, the plaintiff here acquired 
nothing by virtue of the assignment in 
question. 
612 P*2d at 344. (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff Christiansen now stands in the shoes of 
Holiday with respect to its claims against Airport. Holiday 
was required to pay $15,000.00 because of the lack of liability 
insurance covering it for plaintiff's claims. Clearly, having 
expended no more than $15,000.00, Holiday's claim against 
Airport is restricted to that amount. 
C. Airport Is Not An Insurer and Is Liable Only 
For the Actual Damage Incurred by Holiday of 
$15,000.00. Special Rules Applicable to 
Insurers Regarding Conditional Settlements Do 
Not Apply to Airport. 
In this case, Christiansen and Holiday entered into 
a ifconditional settlement" under which Holiday paid $15,000.00 
bnt then stipulated to a judgment of approximately a quarter of 
a million dollars. By agreement, the judgment was not 
enforceable against Holiday but would only be enforceable 
against its insurance carriers or Airport. Under ordinary 
principles of assignment as referred above, the "conditional 
judgment,f cannot be enforced. The maximum detriment to Holiday 
was just $15,000.00. 
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Some courts, however, have developed a special 
exception for insurance companies. The theory being that an 
insurance company has ongoing duties to its insureds of 
defense, good faith, claims handling, etc. When such an 
insurance company abandons its insured, these courts have 
determined that the insured should be able to use a 
"conditional settlement" in order to insulate itself from 
liability and as a weapon against his insurance company. 
(1) Law Relating to Insurance Companies. 
There is a split of authority as to whether the 
unenforceable judgment of such a "conditional settlement" may 
be enforced against an insurance carrier. See, for example, 
Metcalf v. Hartford, 126 N.W.2d 471 (Neb. 1964) as cited 
by plaintiff. In the Metcalf case, the unenforceable 
judgment against the insured was enforced against his insurance 
company who had abandoned him. The court based its judgment on 
the continuing breach of the insurer's duty. On the other 
hand, see Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Insurance, 517 P.2d 262 (Ore. 1973) and following cases such 
as Far West Federal Bank v. Transamerica, 781 P.2d 1259 
(Ore. App. 1989). These cases rejected enforcement of the 
unenforceable judgment against the insurer based upon the fact 
that the insured was not "legally obligated to pay" the 
conditional judgment. 
There is no authority, whatsoever, suggesting that 
these unenforceable judgments may be enforced against 
individuals as opposed to an insurance company. The cases 
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which do enforce such judgments against the insurance companies 
base their holdings upon the stringent obligations that an 
insurance company has to its insured which go beyond mere 
indemnification. These include the duty to defend, the duty to 
handle and adjust cases promptly and good faith, and the duty 
to settle in good faith. See, for example, Critz v. 
Fanners Insurance Group, 230 Cal. App.2d 788 (Cal. 1964) 
which bases its finding on the breach of an insurer's duty to 
settle in good faith; Metcalf v. Hartford, supra, based 
on breach of duty to defend. 
Individuals, such as Airport in this case, do not 
share these same high duties. Their obligation is not a 
continuing one. Rather, it is to compensate the aggrieved 
party for any damages they might suffer as a result of the 
breach of contract. 
The relevant case law was thoroughly reviewed in the 
case of Freeman v. Schmidt Real Estate and Insurance, 755 
F*2d 135 (8th Cir. 1985) (Copy attached for the Court's 
convenience as Addendum A.) The Freeman case involved an 
automobile accident in which Freeman was injured due to the 
negligence of Catron. Catron had a primary liability policy 
with a $50,000.00 limit through AID Insurance. Catron claimed 
that prior to the accident, he had contacted his insurance 
agent# Schmidtf and that Schmidt had agreed to obtain an excess 
policy from AID for an additional $300,000.00 of coverage. 
Schmidt failed to obtain this excess coverage. 
Freeman's claim against Catron was settled with a 
"conditional settlement". Catron confessed to a judgment for 
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$350,000.00, but Freeman agreed not to execute against Catron 
for any amount of the judgment in excess of $50,000.00. AID 
then paid the $50,000.00 primary insurance limit to Freeman. 
Freeman also received an assignment of Catron's claims against 
Schmidt for failure to obtain the excess policy. 
Following the settlement, Freeman sued Schmidt and 
AID on the assigned claim claiming that they were both liable 
for failing to obtain the excess policy. The lower court 
granted summary judgment for defendants and rejected the 
"conditional settlement". Freeman appealed. 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the leading 
cases regarding such "conditional settlements" and discussed 
the split of authority as to whether the judgments could ever 
be enforced. 
In analyzing those cases which have enforced such 
agreements against insurance carriers, the Eighth Circuit 
pointed out that the justification for such enforcement is 
always based upon some bad faith conduct on the part of the 
insurer or other element of misconduct or the insurer has 
failed to honor continuing obligations such as the abandonment 
of the insured, failure to give notice of coverage denial, or 
failure to honor the duty to defend. The court pointed out 
that these rationale have no application in a case such as 
Freeman's where the claim was for the failure to procure 
insurance rather than the breach of an ongoing insurance 
contract. The court stated: 
. . . The policy concerns that cause some 
states to allow such settlements are less 
pressing when the claim against the insurer 
is to be negligent failure to procure 
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insurance rather than bad faith refusal to 
settle or defend. Insureds and injured 
parties alike may need the possibility of 
an assignment and covenant not to execute 
as a weapon against insurer misconduct 
surrounding claims made under the policy. 
[Citations] When the insurer's breach of 
its obligations, however, is merely 
negligent and is removed in time and nature 
from the settlement context, such 
agreements will have less deterrent effect 
on insurance practices, and their possible 
usefulness in this regard is outweighed by 
the concern with collusion. 
755 F.2d at 139. 
The Freeman court went on to affirm the lower 
court's refusal to enforce the large stipulated judgment. 
Plaintiff only received the $50,000.00 payable under the 
primary insurance. 
(2) Case Law Regarding Individuals^ 
There are very few cases in which enforcement of a 
"conditional settlement" has even been attempted against a non 
insurance company. In each case, the attempt has been 
rejected. 
The Freeman case, supra, involved an attempt to 
assert a conditional settlement against both an insurer, AID, 
and an individual, the insurance agent. As noted above, the 
court: wholly rejected that approach. 
In the case of Gatto v. Wallgreen Drug Co., 337 
M.E,2d 23 (111. 1975), a similar attempt was similarly 
rejected. The Gatto case involved a situation where the 
defendant in a personal injury case sought indemnity from the 
contractor who had constructed the roof that allegedly failed 
and caused the injury. Plaintiff had no direct claim against 
the contractor. Prior to trial, plaintiff and defendant 
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entered into an agreement whereby defendant paid $80,000.00 to 
plaintiff and plaintiff agreed not to attempt to collect any 
further amounts from defendant. The parties then went forward 
with trial, contemplating that plaintiff would receive a larger 
judgment against defendant but would only collect it if 
defendant prevailed on his third-party indemnity claim against 
the contractor. 
However, when the agreement came to light, the 
Illinois court had no difficulty in rejecting the attempt. The 
court stated: 
After that agreement was entered into, 
there was no longer any controversy 
whatsoever remaining to be decided between 
those two parties. After the agreement was 
entered into, the lessors [defendants] no 
longer had a claim for a third-party 
indemnification against Calumet 
[contractor] in any amount in excess of 
$80,000.00, and the plaintiffs, as has been 
stated, had no right of action whatsoever 
against Calumet. 
337 N.E.2d at 29. 
See, also, the case of Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 
13-50 Investment Company, 714 S.W.2d 597 (Missouri App. 
1986). The Holiday Inns case involved a similar agreement 
where plaintiff sued defendant and defendant sued a third party 
(who was not an insurance company) claiming an indemnity 
agreement. The Missouri Appellate Court relying on the 
Gatto case and other authority, rejected the attempt to 
increase the indemnitor's liability beyond that of the 
defendant. In fact, it struck the agreement based on the bad 
faith of the defendant in attempting to increase its 
indemnitor's liability. 
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Plaintiff attempts to rely upon the case of 
Amerman v. Farmers Inc. Exchange, 450 P.2d 460 (Utah 1969) 
for some justification that this conditional settlement may be 
enforced against Airport. The Amerman case, however, is 
not on point and involves totally different issues. In 
Anerman, there was no "conditional settlement". The 
adverse party was an insurance company, and there was no 
stipulated judgment, Amerman was a defendant in an 
automobile accident case brought by Mr. Soliz. Amerman had 
an insurance policy with Farmers with limits of $10,000.00. 
After the case was filed, Soliz offered to settle for 
$9f000*00. Farmers rejected the offer. The case went to trial 
and a jury verdict was returned of $15,282.00. Farmers paid 
its $10/000.00 limit and left Amerman to face the excess 
judgment of $5f282.00. At this point, Amerman and Soliz 
entered into an agreement pursuant to which Amerman agreed to 
cooperate in seeking to have Farmers satisfy the excess and 
Soliz agreed he would not execute on the excess amount 
against Amerman directly. 
Soliz thereafter, acting in the name of Amerman, 
sued Farmers directly. Farmers won summary judgment on the 
theory that the agreement with Soliz was an accord and 
satisfaction that eliminated all liability, including that of 
Amermanfs insurance. On appeal, this court reversed and 
remanded for a trial on the merits regarding the allegations of 
bad faith against the insurance company. 
The Amerman case is distinguishable from the 
instant matter in three important respects. First, it involves 
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a claim against an insurance company based upon bad faith 
claiming that the insurance company failed to settle the claim 
in good faith and protect the interests of its insured. 
Second, it involves a damage amount set by jury verdict and 
not a "contingent settlement" agreement in connection with a 
covenant not to execute. Third, it involves a situation where 
a judgment had been entered against the insured and was an 
actual liability against him before any assignment of his 
right against his insurance company was made. As a 
consequence, the judgment was a valid injury and damage to the 
insured. 
Conversely, in the instant case, the $246,000.00 
judgment freely stipulated to by Holiday was only entered and 
agreed to after Holiday had been released of all liability in 
this case. It was not a litigated judicial finding of 
liability and damage. No jury or other fact finder was 
involved in the determination of the amount. (Judge Fishier 
expressly declined to participate in such determination.) 
Whether it was $1.00 or $1 million made no difference to 
Holiday. Holiday's actual real liability was the $15,000.00 
amount they agreed to pay. 
There is nothing in the Amerman decision or any 
other decision cited by plaintiff to support the extension of 
law which plaintiff is now seeking. There is a split of 
authority as to whether contingent settlements may be enforced 
against an insurance company that abandons its insured. 
However, there is absolutely no authority suggesting that such 
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contingent settlements may be enforced against anyone other 
than an insurance company. In this appeal, plaintiff is 
seeking to have this Court extend a questionable special rule 
applicable only to insurance companies beyond all bounds 
previously recognized. 
POINT III 
THE UNENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT STIPULATED TO BY HOLIDAY AND 
PLAINTIFF IS EXCESSIVE ON ITS FACE AND A PATENT SHAM. 
Airport submits that the stipulated judgment of 
$246f000.00 in favor of plaintiff and against Holiday is 
clearly excessive from a brief overview of the facts before the 
Court* This case involves medical special damages at the time 
of settlement totaling approximately $5,000.00 which had been 
primarily incurred for psychiatric treatment and physical 
therapy. Plaintiff had an on/off work history prior to the 
accident, Immediately prior, she had been employed for just 
six weeks at a job paying minimum wage. (R-23.) Plaintiff 
suffered no broken bones, no nerve impairment, no disc injury, 
and had been diagnosed by at least one of her own treating 
doctors as apparently suffering from psychosomatic pain. The 
independent physician employed by Holiday had determined that 
plaintiff did not have any ongoing injury attributable to the 
accident. 
Airport submits that the Court may take judicial 
notice that a settlement in 1982 of approximately one-quarter 
million dollars based upon such evidence is most unusual and 
bears a substantial taint of collusion. 
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Even in those cases which support the enforcement of 
conditional judgments against insurance companies, it is 
clearly stated that such stipulated judgments will be upheld 
only if obtained without fraud or collusion. Metcalf v. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, supra. 
In the instant case, the claimed settlement figure is 
totally disproportionate to the medical special damages 
involved. At the pretrial settlement conference held before 
Judge Croft six weeks before trial, plaintiff's initial 
settlement demand was approximately one-third of the stipulated 
amount. 
A review of the facts of this settlement further 
indicates its collusive nature. Under the settlement 
agreement, plaintiff relieved Holiday from liability for any 
damages in exchange for payment of $15,000.00. This was the 
precise amount that plaintiff had previously been offered in 
settlement. 
If the case had substantially more value than 
$15,000.00, what was her motivation for settling with the only 
defendant upon $15,000.00 payment? Why not proceed to trial? 
Airport submits that the settlement was not motivated by 
charitable considerations plaintiff had towards Holiday. 
Rather, the clear motivation was to secure a $15,000.00 
settlement for plaintiff and then attempt to "set up" Airport 
or Home for a collusive and excessive judgment. 
At a minimum, it is apparent that there are 




This case, as regards Airport, deals simply with the 
value of Holiday's claim against Airport. Holiday was required 
to spend $15^000.00 to settle a personal injury claim. Holiday 
incurred this expense because it had no insurance. 
Consequently, Holiday's loss, resulting from Airport's breach 
of the obligation to procure insurance was limited to 
$15,000.00. 
Plaintiff has put before the Court a series of cases 
which indicate conditional settlements such as this one may be 
enforced against insurance carriers. There is a split of 
authority as to whether such agreements should ever be 
enforced* Regardless of which side of that issue this Court 
would come down on, however, these cases have no relevance to 
Airport*s situation. A review of the cases makes very clear 
that their underlying theory rests on the continuing high 
obligations of an insurer to its insured. Airport is not an 
insurer. The mere fact that Airport may have its own 
independent liability insurance does not change Airport's 
status. It is a partnership consisting of two individuals. As 
such, the special exception recognized by some courts to 
justify the imposition of "conditional settlement" judgments 
does not apply. 
If this Court finds that Home did not insure Holiday, 
then Judge Daniels1 decision limiting recovery to $15,000.00 
should be affirmed. ^-^ 
DATED t h i s /jpft day of f^6\sfrL/&*?/, 1991. 
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RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
L. STEVENS 
Attorneys for Hinckley and 
Howell dba Airport Shuttle 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 4 true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were mailed to each of the following 
this />M day of f - t ^ ^ ^ 1991 to the following: 
Samuel King 
James E. Hawkes 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorney for Appellant 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
S. Baird Morgan 
Attorney for Defendant Home 
Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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souri Approved Instructions. In the main 
appellees argue that the district court cor-
rectly refused to add appellants' proposed 
failure to recall element because no duty to 
recall the rims existed under state or feder-
al law. We agree. 
[8] Generally, under Missouri law, to 
establish a case of actionable negligence 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defend-
ant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the 
defendant breached the duty, through act 
©r omission, and that plaintiff was thereby 
proximately injured. See Virginia D. v. 
Madesco Investment Corp., 648 S.W.2d 
881, 886 (Mo. 1983) (era banc); see also Nel-
mn v. Freeman, 537 F.Supp. 602, 607 
(W.D.Mo.1982), affd sub nom. Nelson By 
Wharton v. Missouri Division of Family 
Services, 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.1983). In 
addition, whether a duty existed is to be 
determined by the court Hyde v. City of 
Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Mo.App. 
1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1226, 103 S.Ct 
1233, 75 L.Ed.2d 467 (1983). 
[9] Appellants provide no statute or 
case law to support their position that ap-
pellees were under a legal duty to recall 
the rims. While such a duty may have 
existed had the Department of Transporta-
tion ordered a recall, see The National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20, no such notification 
of defect and remedy order had been given 
pertaining to these rims. Since no duty to 
recall was established, a fundamental pre-
requisite to establishing negligence was ab-
sent See Nelson, supra, 706 F.2d at 277. 
Although a party has a general right to 
have an instruction presenting its theory of 
the casef a plaintiff has no right to submit 
to the jury an instruction unsupported by 
the evidence adduced at trial. Beard v. 
Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 497 (7th Cir.1979). 
Further there is no error in the trial 
court's refusal to incorporate the duty to 
recall within the duty to warn under the 
facts of this case. We find no basis for 
such an equation, see 2A Frumer and Fried-
man, Products Liability § 17A.01 (1984 
ed.), nor do we perceive any prejudice for 
failing to include it. The central issue of 
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whether the appellees negligently breached 
their duty to warn of the hazards of the 
rims was presented to the jury and the 
question was resolved by the jury against 
the appellants. Appellants' position that 
the appellees should have voluntarily re-
called the rims was apparent throughout 
the course of the trial and further elabora-
tion in the duty to warn instruction was not 
necessary or proper. If the jury did not 
find appellees negligent for failing to warn, 
they could not logically have found them 
negligent for failing to recall. 
In summary, we find no basis for rever-
sal predicated upon the trial court's eviden-
tiary rulings and negligence instructions to 
the jury, and we affirm the judgment of 
the district court entered in accordance 
with the verdict of the jury. 
(p f KEYNUMBttSYSTW> 
Charlie G. FREEMAN, Appellant, 
v. 
SCHMIDT REAL ESTATE & INSUR-
ANCE, INC., Niels R. Schmidt, and 
AID Insurance Company, Appellees. 
No. 84-1227. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit 
Submitted Oct. 9, 1984. 
Decided Feb. 20, 1985. 
Rehearing Denied March 25,1985. 
Injured party brought action against 
insurance agent, agency, and insurance 
company for their negligent failure to pro-
cure liability insurance for insured. In-
jured party also alleged agent and insurer 
had breached their duty to him by failing to 
procure insurance for insured. The United 
States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa, James D. Hodges, Magis-
trate, entered summary judgment for de-
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fendants, and injured party appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, John R. Gibson, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) claim assigned to in-
jured party by insured was not enforceable, 
and (2) under Iowa law there is no direct 
cause of action by crash victim against 
insurer for failure to procure automobile 
liability insurance for tort-feasor. 
Affirmed. 
Heaney, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting 
opinion and would have granted rehearing. 
1. United States Magistrates <3=*5 
In diversity cases, magistrates' conclu-
sions are entitled to some deference by 
Court of Appeals as to questions of purely 
local law. 
2. Assignments <£=>11 
Under Iowa law, tort-feasors never be-
came legally obligated to make any pay-
ments to injured party by virtue of cove-
nant not to execute; thus, injured party 
received no enforceable rights from them 
when they assigned their rights against 
agent, agency and insurance company for 
their negligent failure to procure liability 
insurance for tort-feasors. 
3. Insurance <3=>92.1 
Under Iowa law, there is no duty from 
insurance agents to potential injured party 
such as to give injured party direct cause 
of action against insurers for negligence in 
failing to procure insurance for tort-fea-
sors. 
Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, 
James R. Snyder, Gregory M. Lederer, Ce-
dar Rapids, Iowa, for appellees Schmidt 
Real Estate & Ins., Inc. 
Crawford, Sullivan, Read & Roemerman, 
James W. Crawford, Thomas B. Read, Ce-
dar Rapids, Iowa, for appellee AID Ins. Co. 
Max E. Kirk, Ball, Kirk, Holm & Mardini, 
P.C., Waterloo, Iowa, for appellant. 
1. The Honorable James D. Hodges, United 
States Magistrate for the Northern District of 
Iowa. The parties consented to the assignment 
Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, HEN-
LEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. 
GIBSON, Circuit Judge. 
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge. 
Charlie G. Freeman appeals from a sum-
mary judgment entered against him in his 
action against Schmidt Real Estate & In-
surance, Inc., Niels R. Schmidt, and AID 
Insurance Company for their negligent fail-
ure to procure liability insurance for Rus-
sell K. Catron. Freeman and Catron were 
involved in an automobile collision, and in 
settlement of the resulting litigation, Ca-
tron confessed judgment and assigned his 
rights against the agent, agency and insur-
ance company to Freeman in exchange for 
Freeman's promise not to execute on the 
judgment. Freeman then brought this suit 
alleging both the assigned claim that the 
agent and insurer had breached their duty 
to Catron to procure insurance and a direct 
claim that those same parties had breached 
an independent duty to him in failing to 
meet Catron's request. The magistrate l 
rejected the existence of such an indepen-
dent cause of action and also concluded 
that Freeman, because of the agreement 
not to execute and the "indemnity nature" 
of insurance generally, gained no enforce-
able rights through the assignment from 
Catron. We affirm. 
Catron in the fall of 1978 had had a 
conversation with Niels Schmidt in which 
Schmidt allegedly agreed on behalf of his 
agency and AID Insurance Company to 
procure a $300,000 automobile liability poli-
cy protecting Catron from losses resulting 
from the use of his vehicles. On Novem-
ber 16, 1978, a vehicle owned by Catron 
and operated by Mrs. Catron was involved 
in a collision in which Charlie Freeman was 
injured. Freeman brought suit against the 
Catrons, invoking federal diversity jurisdic-
tion. AID defended the action under a 
previously issued, undisputed $50,000 liabil-
ity policy, with a reservation of rights de-
nying coverage in excess of that amount 
to a magistrate pursuant to 28 ILS.C. § 636(c) 
(1982). 
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following Freeman, slip op. at 6. The magistrate 
also ruled that under Iowa law potential 
future victims of possible automobile acci-
dents do not constitute a discernible class 
as to whom a tortfeasor whose duty is 
created by contract may be liable despite 
the lack of privity. 
[1] In diversity cases we ordinarily ac-
cord substantial weight to the decisions of 
experienced district judges on questions of 
local law which have not yet been treated 
by state courts. Keltner v. Ford Motor 
Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir.1984); 
Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 
F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir.l984>. We have 
earlier stated that bankruptcy judges' con-
clusions are entitled to some deference as 
to questions of purely local law, Grenz 
Super Valu v. Fix, 566 F.2d 614, 615 (8th 
Cir.1977) (per curiam), and we feel no hesi-
tation in considering similarly that weight 
also should be given to comparable deci-
sions of magistrates. The magistrate's or-
der here carefully analyzes the applicable 
law, and our research reveals no relevant 
precedents not fully examined by him. See 
Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, 
Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir.1979). We 
cannot conclude that the magistrate's pre-
diction of Iowa law is erroneous. 
The case was settled on the 
terms: 
1. The Catrons confessed judgment for 
$350,000.00 and costs, 
2. Freeman agreed not to execute 
against the Catrons on any amount 
of the judgment in excess of $50,-
000.00, 
3. [AID paid its $50,000.00 liability lim-
its to Freeman], and 
4. [T]he Catrons assigned to Freeman 
their cause of action against the 
Schmidt agency and any other neces-
sary person or entity for the agen-
cy's failure to obtain a $300,000.00 
policy that would have covered the 
liability asserted against them by 
Freeman. 
Freeman v. Schmidt Real Estate & Insur-
ance, Inc., No. C 82-78, slip op. at 3 (N.D. 
Iowa Feb. 2, 1984). 
Thereafter, Freeman brought this action 
alleging as the Catrons' assignee that 
Schmidt, the agency, and AID (hereafter 
"the insurers") were negligent and breach-
ed an oral contract in failing to obtain the 
additional liability insurance policy in the 
amount of $300,000. Freeman further al-
leged that the insurers' failure constituted 
a negligent breach of a duty owed directly 
to him as the victim of an automobile colli-
sion who would foreseeably be harmed by 
the Catrons' lack of coverage. 
The magistrate granted summary judg-
ment for the insurers. While observing 
that no Iowa case (the parties agree Iowa 
law controls) was directly on point, he went 
on to state: 
It is equally clear that an insurance con-
tract is basically a contract of indemnity. 
Hence, since the Catrons never became 
legally obligated to make any payments 
to plaintiff by virtue of the covenant not 
to execute they would have been entitled 
to nothing under the policy and hence 
have suffered no damage. Accordingly, 
plaintiff received no enforceable rights 
from them and the fact that the underly-
ing obligation was not extinguished is 
irrelevant. 
I. 
As the magistrate recognized, states dif-
fer as to whether an insurer may be liable 
to the injured party when the insured be-
fore judgment is protected by an agree-
ment not to execute. Cases reaching the 
result urged by Freeman basically follow 
one of two rationales. 
First, under the typical liability insurance 
policy, an insurer must reimburse the in-
sured only as to amounts which the insured 
"shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages." A covenant not to execute, 
some courts hold, is merely a contract, and 
not a release, such that the underlying tort 
liability remains and a breach of contract 
action lies if the injured party seeks to 
collect his judgment. Thus, the tortfeasor 
is still "legally obligated" to the injured 
party, and the insurer still must make good 
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on its contractual promise to pay. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Paynter, 122 Ariz. 198, 593 P.2d 948, 953 
(CLApp.1979); Globe Indemnity Co. v. 
Blomfield, 115 Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372, 1375 
(CtApp.1977); cf. Critz v. Farmers Insur-
ance Group, 230 Cal.App.2d 788, 41 Cal. 
Rptr. 401, 410 (1964) (agreement holding 
tortfeasor harmless as to judgment in ex-
cess of his insurance coverage doesn't fore-
close suit against insurer for bad-faith fail-
ure to settle). An uninsured party would 
then be injured by the agent's negligence 
in failing to procure a policy because he 
would have the outstanding ''liability" 
against which he sought to insure.2 
The policy rationale used by other states 
reaching the result urged by Freeman fo-
cuses primarily on the right of the insured 
to protect himself from bad faith conduct 
of his insurer. For example, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court has held that an insured, 
and thus the insurer, is "legally obligated 
to pay" within the meaning of the policy 
despite an agreement not to execute when 
the insured enters into such an agreement 
to protect himself from the insurer's denial 
of coverage and refusal to defend under 
the policy. Metcalf v. Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 
N.W.2d 471 (1964). The Nebraska court 
stressed that the insurer had "repudiated 
its obligation"* to the insured, id., 126 
N.W.2d at 476, and some element of mis-
conduct by the insurer generally has been 
present in the cases in which courts have 
followed Metcalf. E.g., American Family 
2. Liability insurance, which is the most com-
mon form of automobile insurance and is ap-
parently what Freeman sought here, is to be 
distinguished from indemnity insurance, under 
which the insurer has no duty to reimburse 
until the insured has actually paid out money, 
rather than just when the insured becomes "ob-
ligated" to pay. See Steffens v. American Stan-
dard Ins. Co., 181 N.W.2d 174, 175, 176 (Iowa 
1970). 
3. It is not clear that Kelly v. Williams, 411 So.2d 
902, 904 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.). petition for review 
denied. 419 So.2d 1198 (Fla.1982), belongs with 
this group of cases, as cited by the insurers. 
Kelly held that an insurer cannot be liable on a 
third-party claim of bad-faith failure to settle 
when its insured is protected by agreement 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kivela, 408 
N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (insurer 
"abandoned" insured when it refused to 
defend on the ground that the policy had 
been revoked for false statements on the 
application); Griggs v. Bertram, 88 NJ. 
347, 443 A.2d 163 (1982) (insurer failed to 
promptly notify insured that it was denying 
coverage). Even those courts which base 
their findings of liability on the distinction 
between a release and a covenant not to 
execute acknowledge the policy implica-
tions of an opposite conclusion—settle-
ments such as the one here would no long-
er serve their intended purpose. E.g., 
Paynter, 593 P.2d at 953. 
Cases reaching the result urged by the 
insurers here give the "legally obligated to 
pay" language the practical construction 
adopted by the magistrate: An insured pro-
tected by a covenant not to execute has no 
compelling obligation to pay any sum to the 
injured party; thus, the insurance policy 
imposes no obligation on the insurer. 
Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., 267 Or. 397, 517 P.2d 262, 
264 (1973) (en banc); Bendall v. White, 511 
F.Supp. 793, 795 (N.D.Ala.1981); Huffman 
v. Peerless Insurance Co., 17 N.C.App. 
292, 193 S.E.2d 773, 774, cert, denied, 283 
N.C. 257, 195 S.E.2d 689 (1973).3 An indi-
vidual who is uninsured due to an agent's 
negligence then will have suffered no dam-
ages, as he would have had no rights under 
the policy anyway. While this interpreta-
tion does prevent use of settlements such 
as that entered into by the parties here, we 
from an excess judgment. The court, however, 
also distinguished the situation where the in-
jured party brings suit as the insured's assignee 
rather than asserting a direct claim and suggest-
ed that the judgment against the insured would 
not be "blotted out" because it could affect cred-
it and title to real estate. Id. This latter state-
ment seems more in keeping with those cases 
above that hold that an insured protected by an 
agreement not to execute does still have legal 
liabilities and damages giving rise to an obliga-
tion on the pan of the insurer. Furthermore, 
another Florida District Court of Appeal panel 
certified its opinion in Fidelity 6i Casualty Co. v. 
Cope, 444 So.2d 1041, 1046 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 
1984), as being in direct conflict with Kelly. 
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.^ree with the magistrate that Iowa public 
policy does not require a different result in 
:his case. 
Injured parties in Iowa have available 
.ither means whereby they may, after ob-
taining a judgment against an insured, gain 
the insured's rights against the insurer. 
E.g., Steffens v. American Standard In-
surance Co., 181 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1970) 
(injured party after obtaining and execu-
ting a judgment against insured could 
levy on insured's cause of action against 
insurer and purchase it at a sheriffs sale). 
The issue, therefore, is whether the addi-
tional procedure of prejudgment assign-
ment in return for a promise not to execute 
also should be available. Iowa's concerns 
with permitting such a procedure are ap-
parent from cases that erect barriers 
against possibility of collusive settlement. 
For example, in Roach v. Estate of Raven-
stein. 326 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.Iowa 1971), the 
experienced District Judge Hanson denied 
a motion for a consent judgment where the 
settlement involved assignment by the ad-
ministrator of the deceased insured's rights 
against the insurer in exchange for the 
injured party's agreement to seek satisfac-
tion of the judgment only from the estate's 
rights in the insurance policy. The court 
held that the agreement was beyond the 
authority of the administrator due to the 
administrator's failure to investigate the 
merits of the claim against the insured or 
to seek necessary probate court approval 
and that the agreement wras unconsciona-
ble as forcing the insurer to either forgo a 
good-faith denial of coverage or risk being 
bound by any settlement the insured might 
choose to make. The court expressly 
found that the purpose of the settlement 
had been to "relieve the Plaintiff from the 
burden of proving its claim and establish-
ing the liability of the Defendant estate 
and to prevent a defense by the insurer." 
W. at 834. Plaintiff's counsel had actually 
been directing the administrator's activi-
ties. Such collusion, however, would be 
possible anytime the insured were protect-
ed by an agreement not to execute prior to 
entry of judgment; the insured thus loses 
the incentive to contest his liability or the 
extent of the injured party's damages ei-
ther in negotiations or at trial. 
[2] Furthermore, the policy concerns 
that cause some states to allow such settle-
ments are less pressing when the claim 
against the insurer is to be negligent fail-
ure to procure insurance rather than bad 
faith refusal to settle or to defend- In-
sureds and injured parties alike may need 
the possibility of an assignment and cove-
nant not to execute as a weapon against 
insurer misconduct surrounding claims 
made under the policy. Cf. Critz v. Farm-
ers Insurance Group, 230 Cal.App.2d 788, 
41 Cal.Rptr. 401, 408-09 (1964). When the 
insurer's breach of its obligations, how-
ever, is merely negligent and is removed in 
time and nature from the settlement con-
text, such agreements will have less deter-
rent effect on insurer practices, and their 
possible usefulness in this regard is out-
weighed by the concern with collusion. We 
cannot find the magistrate was incorrect in 
his conclusion that Iowa courts would read 
the "legally obligated to pay" policy lan-
guage to protect insurers when their in-
sureds are protected by prejudgment cove-
nants not to execute. 
II. 
[3] We also agree with the magistrate 
that Iowa courts would not find a duty 
running from insurance agents to potential 
injured parties such as to give Freeman a 
direct cause of action against the insurers 
here for negligence in failing to procure 
insurance for Catron. The seminal Iowa 
case is Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 
(Iowa 1969), in which the state supreme 
court for the first time recognized that 
professionals might have some duty of care 
running to persons other than those who 
contracted for their services. The court 
held that an accountant making a negligent 
misrepresentation could be liable to a per-
son who suffered loss in reliance on the 
false statement and who was known to the 
accountant as a prospective user. Id. at 
401-03. The court found it unnecessary to 
determine whether such liability should ex-
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tend to all foreseeable persons, but it did 
say the scope of the duty should be influ-
enced by "the end and aim of the transac-
tion." Id. at 403. 
Later Iowa Supreme Court opinions have 
reaffirmed the concern with potentially un-
limited liability, e.g.t Brody v. Ruby, 267 
N-W.2d 902, 90S (Iowa 1978), and our dis-
trict judges on previous occasions also have 
refused to give Ryan an expansive reading. 
See Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F.Supp. 1155, 
117G-T7 (SJDiowa 1981). The duty of pro-
fessionals runs not to all reasonably fore-
seen injioired parties but just to those actu-
ally foreseen "taking into consideration the 
end and aim of the transaction." Beech v. 
Kmpedh; 302 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Iowa 1981). 
The aim of the alleged transaction be-
tween Catron and the insurance agent 
Schmidt was to protect Catron and to pro-
tect, ham fjroin liability. In states where 
insurance agents have been held to have a 
duty to potential injured parties, insurance 
as a matter of public policy generally is 
characterized as creating a "fund" to com-
pensate accident victims. E.g., Eschle v. 
Eastern Freight Ways, 128 N J.Super. 299, 
319 A.2d 786, 787 "(Law Div.1974). We 
have been cited to no materials showing 
that Iowa has adopted such a view, and 
Walker v. American Family Mutual In-
surance Co., 340 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1983), 
in fact, has strong language to the con-
trary.* Furthermore, the Iowa Supreme 
Court in Long *L McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 
256, 2S2 (Iowa 1982), declined to recognize 
a dutw of an insurer directly to the injured 
party to settle in good faith, stressing that 
the interests of an insured and insurer are 
aligned against the interests of the injured 
party. A more expansive concept as to the 
purposes of automobile liability insurance 
lis Iowa would contradict our recognition in 
section I, supra, of this opinion that an 
4. In Waiker. the Iowa Supreme Court declined 
lo invalidate an exclusionary clause in an insur-
ance contract as against public policy. The 
court stressed that the legislature had not enact-
ed a compulsory insurance law and made the 
following observations: "Our more recent deci-
sions * * * [find] no legislative intent to require 
all motorists to have liability insurance and 
therefore no legislative expression of a public 
policy to protect all victims of traffic accidents," 
insurer has an obligation to pay money 
under a policy only after the insured has 
incurred liability. The "ends and aim" of 
the insurance transaction contemplate a 
duty only to others, for example, possibly 
Catron's wife, who would have been pro-
tected under the policy as to their liability. 
Cf. Waddell v. Davis, 571 S.W.2d 844 
(Tenn.Ct.App.1978) (plaintiff had a direct 
action as a third-party beneficiary against 
the insurance agent for negligent failure to 
procure uninsured motorist coverage if, as 
passenger in car, she would have been an 
"insured" within the meaning of the policy 
sought by her driver). 
This focus similarly distinguishes the 
Massachusetts case of Rae v. Air-Speed, 
Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 435 N.E.2d 628 (1982), 
heavily relied upon by Freeman. The in-
surance sought there was workers' com-
pensation insurance, which by its very na-
ture and purpose does not require that an 
injured employee establish liability on the 
part of the employer before recovering. 
The essence of workers' compensation is 
protection of workers from injuries and not 
protection of employers from liability; 
thus, when an employer approaches an in-
surance agent about workers' compensa-
tion, employees are "actually foreseen" 
parties within the "end and aim of the 
transaction" to whom the agent would owe 
a duty under Iowa law. The Massachu-
setts court, in fact, found the employees to 
be third-party beneficiaries of the contract 
to obtain workers' compensation insurance, 
id., 435 N.E.2d at 633, while the Iowa Su-
preme Court in contrast has found injured 
parties not to be third-party beneficiaries 
of automobile liability policies. Long, 319 
N.W.2d at 262. The magistrate did not err 
in his conclusion that Iowa courts similarly 
would not extend the liability of insurers to 
the situation here. 
340 N.W.2d at 601; "[The cases cited] do not. 
however, declare a judicial policy requiring 
automobile insurers to reimburse all persons 
injured by neglig nt operators of insured vehi-
cles," id. at 602; "(O)ur statutes and decided 
cases disclose no such broad public policy [of 
'assuring protection to the innocent victims of 
automobile accidents'! as was relied upon by the 
Washington Supreme Court." Id. at 603. 
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Since we conclude, as matters of law, 
first that the claim assigned to Freeman 
was not enforceable because Catron was 
not "legally obligated to pay" any judg-
ment and thus had no rights against his 
insurers, and second that Iowa would not 
recognize a direct action by a crash victim 
against an insurer for failure to procure 
automobile liability insurance for the tort-
feasor, the summary judgment in favor of 
the insurers must be affirmed. 
HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. While I do not 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
decisions of a magistrate should be given 
weight, I cannot agree that he correctly 
resolved the legal issue in the case. In my 
view, the Iowa state courts would be more 
likely to follow the views of those states 
that would permit recovery than those that 
would not. Of course, in any action, the 
iesured would have to prove his damages 
and the insurer would have a right to as-
sert any defense that it might have had if 
the insurance had been purchased as re-
quested. This simple safeguard would pre-
vent any collusive settlement. 
There are no policy reasons to deny relief 
to the plaintiffs. To the contrary, the neg-
ligent insurer should bear the responsibility 
rather than the innocent plaintiff. 
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Gene KNIPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Margaret M. HECKLER. Secretary, 
Department of Health and Human 
Services, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 84-1179. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Feb. 13, 19S5. 
Claimant sought social security disabil-
ity insurance benefits and supplemental se-
HECKLER 141 
F.2d 141 (1985) 
curity income benefits. The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services determined 
claimant was not disabled under Social Se-
curity Act and denied request for benefits. 
Claimant sought District Court review. 
The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma, Frank How-
ell Seay, Chief Judge, affirmed decision, 
and appeal was taken. The Court of Ap-
peals, Holloway, Chief Judge, held that: (1) 
finding of no disability was not supported 
by substantial evidence, and (2) claimant 
was per se disabled. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<S=>143.60 
Claimant's heart impairments met list-
ing of impairments, and therefore, findings 
of Secretary of Health and Human Services 
that claimant was not disabled were not 
supported by substantial evidence. Social 
Security Administration Regulations, 
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525(a), 404.1598, App. 
1. §§ 1.00 et seq., 4.04, subd. D, 42 U.S.C. 
A. App. 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<S^140.10 
When claimant's disability is equal to 
or more severe than impairment in listing 
of impairments, he is per se disabled. So-
cial Security Administration Regulations, 
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525(a), 404.1598, App. 
1, §§ 1.00 et seq., 4.04, subd. D, 42 U.S.C. 
A. App. 
3. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=>140.20 
To establish chest pain of cardiac ori-
gin for disability purposes, pain need not 
occur during stress tests nor must it occur 
at any threshold of frequency or duration. 
Social Security Administration Regulations, 
§ 404.1598, App. 1, §§ 4.00, subd. E, 4.04, 
subd. D, 42 U.S.C.A. App. 
4. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=140.20 
Claimant was disabled, where his low 
227o ejection fraction measured at cardiac 
